immunity

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing

Issues

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) heavily regulates public offerings of securities. Does the SEC’s jurisdiction automatically displace the application of antitrust law to these offerings, or does antitrust immunity for an offering of securities only occur when Congress has specifically expressed the intent to exempt a particular practice from antitrust liability?

 

Glen Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd. and other Wall Street investment firms, alleging that the firms violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, by artificially inflating the prices of securities in initial public offerings. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, splitting with other courts, held that since Congress had not specifically immunized this conduct from antitrust liability, the Sherman Act should apply despite the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulation of this area. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will help resolve whether conduct already heavily regulated by the SEC should be automatically immune from antitrust liability, or whether antitrust immunity should only be granted where Congress has expressed a specific intent to immunize the conduct at issue.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in a private damages action under the antitrust laws challenging conduct that occurs in a highly regulated securities offering, the standard for implying antitrust immunity is the potential for conflict with the securities laws or, as the Second Circuit held, a specific expression of Congressional intent to immunize such conduct and a showing that the SEC has power to compel the specific practices at issue..

Glen Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd. (“Credit Suisse”) and other Wall Street investment firms. In re Initial Public Offering Antitrust Litigation, 287 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In re IPO”). Billing alleged that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.

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Gonzalez v. Google LLC

Issues

Can online platforms be held liable for algorithmically recommending harmful third-party content to users?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether online platforms can be held liable for algorithmically recommending third-party content to users. Petitioner Reynaldo Gonzalez argues that Google LLC can be held liable for YouTube’s recommendations of ISIS recruitment videos because YouTube does not qualify for immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Respondent Google LLC argues that since YouTube did not create the ISIS videos at issue, it should be able to claim immunity under Section 230. This case will affect the availability of remedies for victims of harmful online content, internet company accountability, moderation, and online speech.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider, or only limits the liability of interactive computer services when they engage in traditional editorial functions (such as deciding whether to display or withdraw) with regard to such information. 

In 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez, a United States citizen studying abroad in France, was killed in a terrorist attack in Paris. Gonzalez v. Google LLC. The following day, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and posting a YouTube video. Id.

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Haywood v. Drown

Issues

Whether a state may constitutionally withdraw jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil actions filed in state courts against state corrections officers.

 

While Keith Haywood was serving a prison sentence for his second felony conviction, corrections officers filed two separate misbehavior reports against him. After Haywood was found guilty of both offenses, he sued several corrections officers, including the hearing officers who heard his case, in civil lawsuits. Haywood asserted several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The New York Supreme Court dismissed Haywood’s claims on the basis of New York Corrections Law § 24, which prohibits suits against individual state corrections officers rather than against the state itself. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Haywood is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether a state has the sovereign authority to withdraw jurisdiction over an area of federal law. The Supreme Court’s decision will also affect New York corrections officers, who, at present, are immune to suits arising in the course of their jobs. In reaching its decision, the Court will have to balance the efficiency concerns the corrections officers raise with the fairness concerns that Haywood and his supporters raise.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state’s withdrawal of jurisdiction over certain damages claims against state corrections employees — from state courts of general jurisdiction — may be constitutionally applied to exclude federal claims under Section 1983, especially when, as here, the state legislature withdrew jurisdiction because it concluded that permitting such lawsuits is  bad  policy?

In 1992, Keith Haywood received a fifteen- to thirty-year sentence in Attica Correctional Facility for his second violent felony. See Haywood v. Drown, 9 N.Y.3d 481, 484 (N.Y. 2007); see also People v.

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· Workplace Prof Blog

· Oyez

· PrawfsBlawg: A blog post from before the Supreme Court granted cert, arguing that the Court should do so.

· Constitutional Law: Check out more about the Supremacy Clause here.

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Jam v. International Finance Corp

Issues

Does the International Organizations Immunities Act, which gives international organizations the “same immunity” granted to foreign governments, confer the immunity that foreign sovereigns enjoyed when the Act was passed in 1945? Or does the immunity evolve as the immunity given to foreign sovereigns evolves?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”) confers immunity on the commercial activities of international organizations now that foreign governments are no longer afforded that immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held, and the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) now argues, that the IOIA entitles international organizations to virtually absolute immunity and does not incorporate subsequent developments in foreign immunity law that have restricted immunity for commercial acts. However, a group of fishermen and farmers who were harmed by an IFC funded power plant in India counter that the IOIA is meant to track the development of sovereign immunity law, as codified in the FSIA, which does not currently extend to commercial acts. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for jurisdiction over international organizations, international and domestic litigation, and international commercial activity.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the International Organizations Immunities Act—which affords international organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments have, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)—confers the same immunity on such organizations as foreign governments have under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.

The International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) is an international organization (“IO”) purposed with promoting private enterprise in its 184 member countries, mainly by investing in private projects where insufficient capital is available. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 3d 104, 106 (D.D.C.

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Lewis v. Clarke

Issues

Does a lawsuit against a tribal employee for an act he committed within the scope of his employment by the tribe violate tribal sovereign immunity?

With Lewis and Clarke, the Supreme Court will venture into the relatively unfamiliar legal territory of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals employed by Indian tribes. The case arises out of an automobile accident between Brian and Michelle Lewis and William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, which is owned by the Mohegan tribe. In a lawsuit brought by the Lewises, Clarke successfully convinced the Connecticut Supreme Court that he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Lewises argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when a tribal employee is sued in his individual capacity because the finances of the tribe are not formally at risk. Clarke counters that the finances of the tribe are at risk in this suit, and thus, the sovereign immunity of the tribe should extend to him because he was acting within the scope of his tribal employment. To some, the voyage of Lewis and Clarke into the obscure realm of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals imperils tribal coffers; to others, the regulatory power of the states is at stake.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment.

Lewis and Clarke’s five-year voyage to the Supreme Court began on October 22, 2011 with the chance encounter of Brian and Michelle Lewis (“Lewis”) and William Clarke (“Clarke”) in Norwalk, Connecticut. See Lewis v. Clarke, 135 A.3d 677, 679 (Conn. 2016). At the time, Clarke was an employee of the Mohegan tribe and was responsible for transporting patrons of the Mohegan Sun Casino in a limousine to their homes.

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Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson

Issues

Does a member of Congress have immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause against a an employment suit brought under the Congressional Accountability Act by a member of his former congressional staff and can such a dispute be appealed directly to the Supreme Court from a circuit court and heard even after the member of Congress has left office?

 

After a leave of absence, necessitated by health problems, from his position as a State Office Manager for Senator Dayton Brad Hanson was fired. He subsequently sued his former employer for discrimination on the basis of a disability and for failure to pay overtime compensation under the Congressional Accountability Act. Dayton argued, and continues to argue before the Supreme Court, that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution grants him immunity from this action and therefore the suit must be dismissed. This case will turn on the issue of whether an administrative or personnel decision, such as firing an employee, is a legislative act within the meaning of the Clause. To reach that issue, however, the Court will first have to decide whether the CAA entitles Dayton to take a direct appeal from a court of appeals to the Supreme Court, rather than file for a writ of certiorari, and also whether the case has been rendered moot since one party to the action – the Office of Senator Mark Dayton – ceased to exist when Dayton’s term expired.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution bar federal court jurisdiction of an action brought under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (2000), by a congressional employee whose job duties are part of the due functioning of the legislative process?

The Court directed the parties to brief the following additional questions:

Was the Office of Senator Mark Dayton entitled to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit directly to this Court?

Was this a case rendered moot by the expiration of the term of office of Senator Dayton?

Brad Hanson worked as a State Office Manager for Senator Dayton, a former Senator for the state of Minnesota. Brief for Appellant at 5. Hanson’s primary duties included setting up the Senator’s local Minnesota offices and overseeing the Health Care Help Line, a service to constituents experiencing problems with their health insurance carrier. Hanson v. Office of Senator Mark Dayton, 459 F.3d 1, 6 (C.A.D.C. 2006).

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Opati v. Republic of Sudan

Issues

Can the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply retroactively so that plaintiffs can seek punitive damages against a foreign state for terrorist activities that were carried out prior to the enactment of the current version of the statute?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether it can retroactively apply portions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to impose punitive damages on a foreign nation. Monicah Opati seeks to recover punitive damages from the Republic of Sudan for its role in al Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings. Opati contends that under Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Act’s immunity exception for foreign states applies retroactively, thereby reaching the al Qaeda bombings even though they occurred prior to the current statute’s enactment. The Republic of Sudan counters that Altmann does not apply here; and, the FSIA’s plaint text does not allow plaintiffs such as Opati to recover punitive damages retroactively under the Act’s immunity exception for foreign states. This case’s outcome implicates the amount of deference given to political branches and could change the balance between plaintiffs suing under FSIA and defendant foreign states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages under 28 U.S. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute.

In August 1998, al Qaeda, a terrorist organization, launched bomb attacks outside the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Owens v. Republic of Sudan at 762. These attacks killed many U.S. citizens who were government employees and contractors. Id.

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Pottawattamie County, IA v. McGhee

Issues

Can a prosecutor who knowingly procures false testimony and introduces such testimony at trial be subject to a §1983 civil suit?

 

In 2005, Curtis W. McGhee and Terry J. Harrington, both convicted of murder in 1978, sued Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and former county attorneys Joseph Hrvol and David Richter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the Pottawattamie prosecutors coerced false testimony from third party witnesses and then introduced that testimony in their murder trials. The prosecutors argued that they were immune from the lawsuit based on the doctrine of absolute immunity, but both the district court and the Eighth Circuit disagreed. The Supreme Court’s decision will reveal the extent to which prosecutors are immune from liability for their pre-trial misconduct. This clarification may affect the way prosecutors try cases, and will, undoubtedly, influence the degree to which defendants can hold their prosecutors accountable for due process violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a prosecutor may be subjected to a civil trial and potential damages for a wrongful conviction and incarceration where the prosecutor allegedly (1) violated a criminal defendant's "substantive due process" rights by procuring false testimony during the criminal investigation, and then (2) introduced that same testimony against the criminal defendant at trial.

In 1978, Petitioners Joseph Hrvol and David Richter obtained convictions and life sentences against Respondents Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington for the murder of retired police captain John Schweer in Council Bluffs, Iowa the previous year. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008).

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qualified immunity

Rehberg v. Paulk

Issues

Whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” in grand jury proceedings is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim after presenting false testimony.

 

Relying on false testimony, three grand juries indicted Petitioner Charles Rehberg for varying charges. After the indictments were dismissed, Rehberg brought a private suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several parties, including Respondent James Paulk, who had testified before all three grand juries. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Paulk, an investigator in the district attorney’s office, was entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. Rehberg argues that complaining witnesses were never given absolute immunity under common law, and that a lesser grant of qualified immunity is more appropriate under the circumstances. Paulk, on the other hand, contends that a decision to withhold absolute immunity will discourage public officials from giving complete and objective testimony before grand juries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), this Court held that law enforcement officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjured testimony that they provide at trial. But in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), this Court held that law enforcement officials are not entitled to absolute immunity when they act as “complaining witnesses” to initiate a criminal prosecution by submitting a legally invalid arrest warrant. The federal courts of appeals have since divided about how Briscoe and Malley apply when government officials act as “complaining witnesses” by testifying before a grand jury or at another judicial proceeding. The question presented in this case is: 

Whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” by presenting perjured testimony against an innocent citizen is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim for civil damages.

Petitioner Charles Rehberg sent anonymous faxes parodying and criticizing the Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia, seeking to raise public awareness about the hospital’s unethical billing and accounting practices. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2010).

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